On the use of a cooperative neighbor position verification scheme to secure warning message dissemination in VANETs by Fogue, Manuel et al.
On the Use of a Cooperative Neighbor Position
Verification Scheme to Secure Warning Message
Dissemination in VANETs
Manuel Fogue∗, Francisco J. Martinez∗, Piedad Garrido∗, Marco Fiore†,
Carla-Fabiana Chiasserini‡, Claudio Casetti‡, Juan-Carlos Cano§, Carlos T. Calafate§, Pietro Manzoni§
∗University of Zaragoza, Spain. E-mail: {mfogue, f.martinez, piedad}@unizar.es
†IEIIT-CNR, Italy and INRIA, France. E-mail: marco.fiore@ieiit.cnr.it
‡Politecnico di Torino, Italy. E-mail: {chiasserini, casetti}@polito.it
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Abstract—Efficient schemes for warning message dissemi-
nation in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) use context
information collected by vehicles about their neighbor nodes
to guide the dissemination process. Based on this information,
vehicles autonomously decide whether or not they are the most
appropriate forwarding nodes. These schemes maximize their
performance when all the vehicles advertise correct information
about their positions. Position errors introduced by nodes attack-
ing the system, and other common errors due to malfunction of
the localization systems, may drastically reduce the performance
of the dissemination process. We present a proactive Cooperative
Neighbor Position and Verification (CNPV) protocol that detects
nodes advertising false locations and selects optimal forwarders
so as to mitigate the impact of adversarial users. We combine
our mechanism with two warning dissemination schemes for
VANETs, and demonstrate how these algorithms can benefit from
the use of our security scheme in the presence of malicious nodes
trying to exploit the inherent vulnerabilities of each algorithm.
Index Terms—Neighbor Position Verification, Vehicular Ad
Hoc Networks, Warning Message Dissemination, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are wireless networks
that do not require any fixed infrastructure and are considered
essential for cooperative applications among cars on the road.
VANETs are usually classified as a subset of Mobile ad hoc
networks (MANETs), but they present some distinctive char-
acteristics such as (a) road-constrained high-speed mobility
leading to rapidly variable network topologies, (b) challenging
RF signal propagation conditions, (c) no significant power
constraints, and (d) very large networks scale involving up
to hundreds of vehicles.
VANETs have many possible applications, ranging from
road safety through cooperative awareness to real-time dis-
tributed traffic management via dissemination of information
on traffic congestion and road status. In this work we focus
on traffic safety and efficient warning message dissemination,
where the most critical goal is to reduce the latency while
ensuring the accuracy of the information when a dangerous
situation occurs. There, any vehicle detecting an abnormal sit-
uation (i.e. accident, slippery road, etc.) is deemed to notify the
anomaly to nearby vehicles that could face the same problem
later on. This is achieved through multi-hop forwarding, being
location information about neighboring vehicles the key to
decide whether to rebroadcast an incoming warning message
or not. Therefore, context information on car positioning is
paramount to the correct operation of the system. However,
most warning message dissemination schemes assume that
all the information shared between vehicles is accurate, thus
location errors due to positioning malfunction or attacks can
seriously affect performance.
In this paper, we propose a Cooperative Neighbor Position
and Verification (CNPV) protocol based on a proactive ap-
proach. Our scheme allows securing warning dissemination
protocols in adversarial environments where advertised posi-
tions are not always accurate. We evaluate the effectiveness of
CNPV on the performance of two of the most efficient – yet
insecure – dissemination algorithms developed for VANETs.
Our mechanism is fully distributed and, combined with dis-
semination algorithms that require position information from
communication neighbors, it avoids that malicious vehicles
announcing false positions are considered for the forward-
ing of critical information. As a result, CNPV improves
the performance of the dissemination process in adversarial
environments of up to 50% in terms of warning notification
time and percentage of uninformed nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews the related work on neighbor positions localization
and verification, as well as about using context information
to improve warning message dissemination in VANETs. Sec-
tion III presents our proactive neighbor position verification
algorithm. Section IV details the simulation environment used
for the performance evaluation, whose results are presented
and discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this Section, we first review existing proposals for the
localization and position verification of communication neigh-
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bors. We then show how current warning message dissemina-
tion schemes make use of context information to maximize
their performance.
A. Neighbor Localization and Verification
The collection of neighbor locations in a wireless network is
performed by using positioning systems and by verifying the
announced positions. Regarding positioning, self-localization
can be performed through Global Navigation Satellite Sys-
tems (GNSS) [1]. Own position information can then be
announced to nearby vehicles using vehicle-to-vehicle Direct
Short-Range Communication (DSRC). In addition, different
existing methods can be combined to find out the neighbors
within communication range. In our case study, we will rely
on the Time of Flight (ToF) technique based on the difference
between message transmission and reception times [2].
Once a node knows the positions of its neighbors, it
must ensure that the advertised positions correspond to the
true geographic coordinates, i.e., it must perform a location
verification. In the existing literature, we can find several
mechanisms for infrastructured or hybrid networks: these
provide solutions to secure localization using fixed or mobile
nodes connected securely to the certification authority [3], or
through multilateration methods based on ranging and Time
Difference of Arrival (TDoA) [4].
As far as ad hoc-oriented location verfication protocols are
concerned, a secure position verification system for VANETs
is presented in [2]. Although effective, the proposed solution
requires a minimum fixed infrastructure, which does not meet
our criteria for pure VANETs. In [5], the authors proposed
a distributed neighbor position verification mechanism for
wireless networks. This protocol is designed to be reactive,
i.e., a node called verifier must start the process at a given
time to discover and verify the position of its communication
neighbors. However, a high number of messages are required
by this reactive protocol, thereby imposing a high channel
overhead. In addition, there can be an important delay between
the beginning of the process and the verification of neighbor
positions. Hence, using reactive approaches is not appropriate
for networks where nodes need to be constantly aware of the
position of their neighbors.
B. Warning Message Dissemination
Dissemination schemes are commonly used in VANETs for
critical applications. Among the existing mechanisms to im-
prove warning message dissemination in VANETs, two of the
most recent and effective algorithms are the enhanced Message
Dissemination based on Roadmaps (eMDR) [6] and the Urban
Vehicular broadCAST (UV-CAST) [7]. These protocols make
use of information about neighbor vehicle positions to decide
whether to rebroadcast the message or not, and to determine
if the vehicle is the most appropriate one to store the message
for future forwarding.
In eMDR, vehicles decide whether to rebroadcast a received
message depending on the position of the sender and of the
receiver. If they are located in different streets, or the receiver
vehicle is close to a junction giving access to new streets,
the receiver vehicle is allowed to forward the message. In
particular, only the vehicle closest to the geographic center of
the junction, obtained from integrated GPS maps, is allowed
to forward the message. This strategy aims at reducing the
number of broadcasted messages.
The UV-CAST algorithm selects different mechanisms
for message dissemination in VANETs. Vehicles in a well-
connected regime rebroadcast incoming messages after a wait
time if no redundant messages are received. Vehicles in a
disconnected regime must decide if they are suitable for
the Store-Carry-Forward (SCF) task, forwarding the message
whenever they meet new neighbors. The SCF task is assigned
to vehicles that have a small expected time before they see new
neighbors, obtained as the boundary vehicles of the neighbors
in communication range, i.e., located on the vertices of the
boundary polygon.
Both eMDR and UV-CAST are designed to blindly trust
the information provided by other vehicles. Vehicles may
announce incorrect positions due to several factors: uninten-
tional inaccuracies, e.g., GPS errors in poorly covered areas;
however, malicious vehicles can also advertise an incorrect
position to decrease the performance of a system, or to gain
advantage among peers, for example by attracting traffic to
a specific area. Hence, the information provided by other
vehicles should be verified before being trusted and used as
an input to dissemination algorithms. To this end, we design
CNPV, a protocol that proactively determines which neighbors
are advertising false information about their positions.
III. THE CNPV PROTOCOL
We first introduce the communication environment we will
consider in the rest of the paper, and then detail the CNPV
protocol we propose.
A. System Model
We consider a vehicular ad hoc network where the com-
munication neighbors of a vehicle are all the nodes that it
can reach directly when transmitting. All the vehicles are
synchronized to a common time reference, and we assume
that each node is able to determine its own geographical
position with a maximum error ǫp. Both criteria regarding
timing and geographical position can be fulfilled by equipping
vehicles with GPS receivers, a plausible assumption nowadays
since this technology is experiencing a fast introduction in the
automotive industry.
In addition, vehicles are capable of performing Time of
Flight (ToF)-based Radio Frequency (RF) ranging with a
maximum error equal to ǫr. Typically, the RF interfaces have
a frequency of operation of 44MHz, obtaining an average
error of 6.8m when transmitting the signal at the speed of
light, 3 ·108m/s. This technique is used to calculate distances
between the sender and the receiver of a given message. As
discussed in [8], this is a reasonable assumption, although
it requires modifications to off-the-shelf radio interfaces. An
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Fig. 1. Temporal detail of the proactive neighbor position verification algorithm.
example of a successful case of RF interface used for ranging
can be found in [9].
Each vehicle X has a unique identifier, as well as a private
key kX and a public key KX , to encrypt and decrypt data.
Additionally, vehicles have a set of one-time use keys available
{k′X ,K
′
X}, and they can produce digital signatures (SigX)
with their private key. We assume that the correspondence
between X and KX can be validated by any node, as in state-
of-the-art secure communication architectures [10].
Vehicles are correct if they comply with the verification
protocol, or adversarial if they deviate from it. Adversaries
can be considered either internal or external to the net-
work, depending on whether they have a set of recognized
cryptographic keys or not. External adversaries have fewer
opportunities to thwart the system; in fact, they can only serve
as relay nodes since messages with unrecognized signatures
will be immediately rejected by the rest of nodes. Hence, we
only consider the more challenging case of internal network
adversaries.
B. CNPV Protocol Objectives
The CNPV protocol is proactive, as each node participating
in the system periodically sends its location and the informa-
tion necessary to the protocol operation. Hence, our approach
is proactive in the sense that node messages are not the result
of explicit queries.
The proposed protocol is designed to attain two main
objectives in a mobile environment: (i) acquiring the positions
of the neighbors, and (ii) verifying the correctness of these
positions. The system is designed so as to allow each node to
decide whether the positions advertised by its neighbors are
accurate or not. Thus, a node assigns one of three possible
states to each of its neighboring nodes:
• Correct (verified): the advertised position corresponds to
the true geographic position of the neighbor;
• Incorrect (faulty): the advertised position does not corre-
spond to the true position of the neighbor, tagged as an
attacker;
• Unverifiable: the information collected so far is not
enough to determine the correctness of the advertised
position.
The CNPV protocol is based on a cooperative approach
that takes advantage of the broadcast nature of the wireless
medium, and allows each node to verify the positions of its
communication neighbors through the messages it receives.
We remark that the position validation is run by each node
independently, and that CNPV does not require any exchange
of the resulting neighbor states among nodes. Thus, the
protocol does not require nodes to have a global knowledge of
the network, nor to find a global consensus on the verification
of claimed positions.
C. CNPV Protocol Message Exchange
We will use the following notation to describe the neighbor
position verification process:
• tX : transmission time of the message for node X .
• tXY : reception time of the message sent by X and
received by Y .
• NX : set of neighbors of node X .
• pX : position of node X .
As show in Figure 1, the proactive verification process uses
a message exchange mechanism that takes place in two rounds
with the same duration:
• Round 1: In the first round, each node X participating
in the protocol chooses a random time tX in the interval
corresponding to the first round (at the application layer).
Once this time is reached, the node sends its HELLO
message at time tX over the transmission channel. This
message is initially anonymous because it is signed by
a one-time use key. The message is received by all the
neighbors at a specific time for each node, named tXY
for node Y .
• Round 2: Once all HELLO messages are sent, nodes
execute the second round of the protocol. Each node X
sends a new message at time t′X corresponding to the
duration of the first round plus a constant time, called
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guard time. Therefore, all the nodes will transmit their
messages in the same order in the second round. The
HELLO message sent in the second round contains the
identity of the sender, as well as the information needed
to make the correspondence with the first message, sent
anonymously during the first round.
Algorithm 1: Message exchange routine
1 node X do
2 if round == 1 then




4 else if round == 2 then
5 X : tX = tX + Tround + Tguard
6 when tx do
7 if round == 1 then

















11 else if round == 2 then












After the message exchange routine is complete, each node
can create the correspondences between the messages sent
in the first round and the announced neighbors. Moreover,
each nodes retrieves from the second-round messages the
transmission times of the first-round HELLO message for each
of its neighbors. Such information, together with the locally
stored reception times of first-round messages, allows each
node to use ToF-based RF ranging to calculate the distance
that separates them from their neighbors.
For example, let us consider the case of a node S receiving
a message from X . S retrieves tX , the transmission time of
the message sent by X , from the second-round message by
X ; moreover, S has locally stored tXS , i.e., the time at which
it received the same message. Using this information S can
determine the distance that separates it from X .
D. CNPV Protocol Verification Algorithm
Once the message exchange is finished, it is time for the
participating nodes to verify the positions advertised by their
neighbors. To this end, three tests are subsequently carried
out by each of the nodes, allowing them to determine if
the positions advertised are accurate or not. A more detailed
description of such tests is available in [5].
Three tests are performed for position verification: the
Direct Symmetry test, the Cross-Symmetry test, and the Mul-
tilateration test. After running the three tests for each com-
munication neighbor, each vehicle is able to determine if the
interchanged information is trustworthy, hence the neighbor
may be considered as a potential forwarding node; or it
may be considered malicious, in which case, the neighbor
is considered as faulty and not suitable to rebroadcast the
message. Next, we present the three different tests.
1) Direct Symmetry (DS) Test: During this test, the verifier
node compares its own information with the information
collected from each of its neighbors. This test does not use the
cooperative approach of the protocol. During this test, two sub-
tests are performed: (i) a coherence test, where the distance
calculated using the time of flight of radio signal must be
coherent with the position announced by the neighbor, and
(ii) a signal range test, where the calculated distance must be
less than the maximum range of the Radio Frequency (RF)
communication system.
2) Cross-Symmetry (CS) Test: Unlike the DS test, the
Cross-Symmetry test exploits the collaborative behavior of
our approach by performing cross checks. The purpose is to
verify the collected information from the neighbors which are
mutually interconnected. The CS test ignores the nodes already
considered incorrect by the DS test, and compares pairs of
nodes such that the two nodes and the verifier node are within
communication range. When nodes meet these conditions, they
are tested using the same criteria as in the DS test. The
algorithm works by counting the number of links considered
correct and the number of links considered incorrect. The ratio
of invalid links with respect to the total number of links for
a given node allows determining if its advertised position is
trustworthy. With a ratio limit δ set as 50%, the majority
value is considered. A smaller ratio limit will provide greater
security, but it limits the number of links correctly verified.
3) Multilateration (ML) Test: The last of the three proposed
tests is applied to previously verified nodes. We want to detect
suspicious situations where nodes have deliberately ignored to
announce the links they have with other nodes by counting the
number of neighbors who reported a link not announced by the
suspicious node. If there are at least two, then we can compute
– for each pair of nodes including a verifier S and a neighbor
Y – a curve in which node X is present. If we can calculate
two or more curves, node X is located at the intersection of
these curves, that, due to their geometrical construction, are
hyperboles. GPS and ToF-based RF ranging error may lead to
curves that do not perfectly intersect in one point. Thus, the
centroid of such (closely located) intersections is determined
and then compared to the distance advertised by the suspicious
node. If the error threshold is exceeded, the node is considered
invalid. In our simulations, the error threshold is set to 10
meters.
IV. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
We evaluate the impact of the CNPV protocol on eMDR
and UV-CAST, two state-of-the-art warning message dissem-
ination algorithms.
Since deploying and testing VANETs is unpractical due
to high economic costs and system complexity, we resort to
simulation as a viable alternative to actual implementation.
We selected two different road layouts to test our proposal.
Figure 2(a) shows the area between Martin Luther King Blvd.
and West Slauson Av. in the city of Los Angeles (CA, USA),
which has a very regular street layout similar to synthetic




Fig. 2. Scenarios used in our simulations as street graphs in SUMO: (a)
section of the city of Los Angeles (USA), and (b) section of the city of
Madrid (Spain).
Castellana in the city of Madrid (Spain), shown in Figure 2(b),
is an example of European city with a more irregular layout.
The scenarios were obtained from OpenStreetMap [11], each
one representing a 4-km2 square area.
Vehicular mobility is generated with the CityMob for
Roadmaps (C4R) tool1, which can import maps from Open-
StreetMap and is based on SUMO [12], a realistic open-
source traffic simulation package. The microscopic mobility
is modeled through the Krauss mobility model with some
modifications to allow multi-lane behavior [13]. From a
macroscopic viewpoint, our mobility simulations account for
areas with different vehicle densities, ranging from 12.5 to 100
vehicles/km2. Since in a realistic urban environment the traffic
is not uniformly distributed, being driven by points of interest
that attract vehicles, we adopt the Downtown Model [14] to
determine such points of attraction in the roadmaps and to
derive the macroscopic traffic flows.
Simulations were carried out using the ns-2 simulator [15],
modified to include the IEEE 802.11p [16] standard so as to
closely follow the upcoming WAVE standard. In terms of the
1
C4R is freely available at http://www.grc.upv.es/software/
physical layer, the data rate used for packet broadcasting is
of 6 Mbit/s, as this is the maximum rate for broadcasting in
802.11p. At the MAC layer, channel access priorities were
implemented: four different Access Categories (ACs) provide
different priority to application messages, where AC0 has the
lowest and AC3 the highest priority. The simulator was also
modified to make use of our Real Attenuation and Visibility
(RAV) propagation model [17], which increases the level of
realism of the VANET simulations by accounting for real
urban roadmaps and obstacles that have a strong influence
over the wireless signal propagation.
In each scenario, three warning-mode vehicles generate
warning messages at a rate of 1 message/second, while the
rest of normal-mode vehicles act as relaying nodes for these
messages. The vehicles in the simulation also broadcast one-
hop HELLO messages at a rate of 1 message/second in order
to implement the neighbor position verification algorithm.
We evaluate the following performance metrics of interest:
the warning notification time, i.e., the time required by normal
vehicles to receive a warning message sent by a warning-
mode vehicle, and the percentage of blind vehicles, i.e., the
percentage of normal-mode vehicles that do not receive a
warning message. We are also interested in assessing the
overhead that CNPV induces in the network. All results
represent the average of multiple executions with different
random seeds, and fall within a 95% confidence interval.
A. Adversary model
Simulations account for different percentages of adversarial
vehicles, namely 3%, 6%, and 9% of the total number of
vehicles. Attackers aim at reducing the performance of the
warning message dissemination process, by attracting the road
safety data traffic but not forwarding the warning messages
received. To that end, they announce false positions so as
to exploit the vulnerabilities of the eMDR and UV-CAST
algorithms, as detailed next.
In the case of the eMDR algorithm, vehicles closer to
roadmap junctions have an advantage over their neighbors
since they have the highest chances of reaching new areas
of the topology. Hence, a simple attack that would reduce
the performance of warning message dissemination using
this algorithm consists in announcing bogus positions very
close to the junction coordinates. Detecting a neighbor in a
more appropriate location, all other vehicles will refrain from
forwarding the message. Some time later, another node might
forward the message even though it is in a less favorable posi-
tion, since the integrity of the system has been compromised.
Regarding the UV-CAST protocol, the Store-Carry-Forward
task is performed by boundary vehicles, and a vehicle which
is not located in the vertices of the boundary polygon will
not be assigned this task. Hence, vehicles advertising false
positions relatively far from their actual position will obtain
advantage over their neighbors, since they will be located with
higher probability in the boundary area. Fewer neighbors will
be assigned the data carrying task, reducing the chances that























































































































































































Fig. 4. Warning notification time in Madrid with 400 vehicles varying the percentage of adversaries: (a) 3%, and (b) 9%.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We first study the effect of adversarial nodes on the per-
formance of the dissemination process, when eMDR and
UV-CAST are used in their legacy version as well as in
combination with the CNPV protocol we propose. Then, we
assess the overhead induced by the use of the CNPV protocol.
A. Securing Warning Message Dissemination
Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of the dissemination
process through time in the Madrid map, under different
vehicle densities and percentages of adversaries. As we can
observe, the legacy UV-CAST scheme is noticeably affected
even when a low percentage of attackers are present in the
environment: when CNPV is used, the number of informed
vehicles grows by 15-20% for most warning notification times.
The differences observed when CNPV is used or not tend
to grow with increasing vehicle densities, which implies that
attackers can more easily slow down the overall process in
the presence of a dense vehicular network. Regarding the
two mechanisms used by the UV-CAST algorithm, the Store-
Carry-Forward (SCF) task is mainly inhibited when adver-
saries announce false positions. Results show that this is a
very important mechanism to reach new areas of the roadmap,
and hence the UV-CAST algorithm is greatly affected by the
presence of adversaries.
The eMDR algorithm is more resistant, in general, to
adversaries trying to thwart it. As shown in Figure 3, when
the vehicle density remains low, there are not enough vehicles
to cover most of the junctions of the topology, and hence
the warning message reception probability is only reduced by
10% at each time instant. However, the effect of the adversary
nodes is more evident when the vehicle density increases, since
there is more area of the map occupied. This effect is mainly
noticeable in Figure 4(b), where we can see an important























































































































































































Fig. 5. Warning notification time in Los Angeles with 6% adversaries per warning node and varying the density of vehicles: (a) 100 vehicles, (b) 200
vehicles, (c) 300 vehicles, and (d) 400 vehicles,
To better understand the impact of vehicle density, Figure 5
shows the evolution of the warning dissemination process in
Los Angeles when the percentage of adversaries is fixed at 6%.
Again, we observe a similar tendency for both dissemination
schemes with respect to the Madrid scenario. The UV-CAST
algorithm is very sensitive to adversaries in the environment,
and there is a uniform performance reduction in all the
tested scenarios, independently of the chosen vehicle density.
However, the eMDR scheme is able to support up to 200
vehicles (50 vehicles/km2) without a significant performance
loss. Whenever the vehicle density exceeds this threshold,
the number of adversary vehicles is enough to degrade the
dissemination process, making the selection of the optimal
forwarding vehicles unfeasible. We must remember that this
selection uses the information of the road topology to choose
those vehicles with a better line-of-sight with respect to the
streets (i.e., the closest to the center of the junctions), and
adversary vehicles sending this information will affect all the
vehicles in the vicinity of the junction. As the number of
adversaries rises, the number of occupied junctions increases,
and the selection of forwarding vehicles is not optimal.
B. CNPV Protocol Overhead
As shown in Figure 6, the percentage of packet traffic
received by the simulated vehicles and produced by the use of
the CNPV protocol is less than 8% of the total traffic in all
the tested scenarios when 3% of adversaries are considered.
We can observe how the percentage becomes higher when the
UV-CAST algorithm is used: 5-8% of traffic for UV-CAST
compared to 1-3% for eMDR; notice that this difference is
mainly due to the lower number of messages produced by UV-
CAST compared to the eMDR scheme. In addition, in regular
maps like Los Angeles, the ratio between HELLO messages
received and warning messages is increased as the vehicle
density grows, since a higher percentage of vehicles are
directly connected, whereas the overhead decreases in irregular























































Fig. 6. Overhead produced due to the security mechanism with 3% of
adversaries.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a proactive, cooperative mech-
anism for neighbor position verification based on the infor-
mation interchanged among one-hop neighbors. Our CNPV
protocol is easily adaptable to different warning message
dissemination schemes that make use of the neighbor infor-
mation to decide the most appropriate forwarding scheme in
VANETs. CNPV allows verifying the position of the neighbors
before deciding the next forwarding vehicle, favouring the
dissemination process and a limiting the number of vehicles
that do not receive the warning messages.
We evaluated the performance of the CNPV protocol by
coupling it with two dissemination algorithms, eMDR and
UV-CAST, showing how (i) the presence of adversary nodes
affects the warning message dissemination performance in
urban scenarios, and (ii) CNPV can help to reduce the impact
of adversarial users in the vehicular network. When applied
in conjunction to the eMDR algorithm, we see how this
dissemination scheme supports a high percentage of attackers
if the vehicle density is low; however, increasing the number
of vehicles in the area allows adversary nodes to occupy
the best positions of the road topology, noticeably reducing
the performance of the dissemination process. When applying
our approach to the UV-CAST scheme, we observe that it
is especially sensitive to vehicles announcing false positions,
since the store-carry-and-forward approach adopted to reach
new areas in disconnected regimes is only performed by
boundary vehicles. A vehicle sending false information can
easily become the boundary vehicle, avoiding vehicles with
a more favorable position to assume this role. Overall, our
results show how CNPV improves the performance of the
dissemination process in adversarial environments by up to
50% in terms of warning notification time and percentage of
uninformed nodes.
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